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**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security

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Report of the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to the United States Congress pursuant to Section 44938, Title 49, Transportation

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents a summary of events, programs, and accomplishments in civil aviation security in 1996, including the effectiveness of screening in air transportation and foreign air carrier and airport security. Recent events, growth of the aviation industry, and the intelligence assessments that pointed to an increasing threat of terrorism within the United States raised concern about the standard everyday measures that formed the baseline of domestic aviation security. This concern, the tragedies of ValuJet Flight 592 and TWA Flight 800, and major legislation drove a year of sweeping changes and growing partnerships and programs in civil aviation security.

Significant Events and Activities of 1996

January

January 31, the *Unescorted Access Privilege Rule*, which requires people seeking unescorted access to restricted areas of the airport to have employment history checks, became effective.

February

February 24, two unarmed aircraft belonging to a Cuban exile group, Brothers to the Rescue, were shot down over international waters by Cuban military aircraft, killing four people.

March

March 1, the Secretary of Transportation removed public notification resulting from a 1995 assessment that the government of the Philippines was unable to maintain and carry out effective security measures at the airport in Manila.

March 21, the Secretary of Transportation issued public notification that the government of Greece was unable to maintain and carry out effective security measures at the airport in Athens. This public notification was removed on May 15.

April

April 24, Congress passed the *Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act*. Section 322 of the Act requires foreign air carriers traveling to and from U.S. airports to have security measures identical to U.S. air carriers flying from those same airports.

May

May 11, a hazardous materials fire in its cargo hold destroyed ValuJet Flight 592 over the Florida Everglades. None of the 110 people on board survived.

July

July 16, FAA Administrator presented the Second Annual Screener of the Year Award to Ms. Dianne Robinson from Honolulu International Airport.

On the morning of July 17, the FAA s Aviation Security Advisory Committee formed a Baseline Working Group tasked to identify options and develop recommendations for effective and sustainable system improvements.

The evening of July 17, TWA Flight 800 exploded after leaving John F. Kennedy International Airport, killing all 230 passengers and crew.

July 19, the Olympic Games began in Atlanta, Georgia, which required stringent aviation security.

July 25, President Clinton announced heightened security measures and the establishment of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.

July 26, an Iberia flight between Madrid, Spain, and Havana, Cuba, diverted to Miami International Airport. Three people were arrested in connection with this hijacking.

August

August 30, the Baseline Working Group of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee issued its initial report.

September

September 9, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security issued its initial report.

The Fiscal Year 1997 Department of Transportation Appropriations Act provided FAA with over $10 million to expand and improve the dangerous goods and air cargo security program.

FAA began to establish consortia of parties with responsibilities for aviation security at the Nation s commercial airports.

October

October 9, the President signed the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996.

The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 provided funding necessary to implement new and expanded aviation security programs and activities.

A security equipment integrated product team (SEIPT) of acquisition and security experts was formed within the FAA to plan, purchase, and install explosives detection devices and other advanced security equipment at many of the busiest U.S. airports, using $144 million for the purchase of equipment provided by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997.

FAA initiated a pilot project in Los Angeles and Honolulu in response to an apparent increase in incidents of assault on flightcrews.

November

An FAA-FBI working group for joint threat and vulnerability assessments at the Nation s high risk airports was established.

November 27, FAA published the *Falsification of Security Records Rule* to prevent the use of falsified documents to obtain positions allowing unescorted access to secure airport areas.

December

The Universal Access System pilot project, which will improve the efficiency of allowing appropriate unescorted access to restricted areas of the airport to transient airline employees, was completed.

December 23, the Secretary of Transportation removed public notification resulting from a 1995 assessment that the government of Colombia was unable to maintain and carry out effective security measures at the Eldorado International Airport in Bogota.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) submits this report pursuant to Title 49, U.S.C., Sections 44938 and 44907 (formerly Sections 315(a), 316(b), and 1115(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended). The report presents a summary of events, programs, and accomplishments in civil aviation security in 1996, including the effectiveness of screening in air transportation and foreign air carrier and airport security.

FAA Civil Aviation Security Mission

The FAA s aviation security mission is to protect the users of commercial air transportation against terrorist and other criminal acts. Because terrorists seek to destroy public confidence in the safety of air travel and disrupt this vital segment of the U.S. and world economies, the continued growth of commercial air transportation hinges on the effectiveness of aviation security measures. The FAA assigns measures for both current and increased threat situations through regulations and works with the aviation industry to implement those measures. Protecting the FAA critical infrastructure--facilities, equipment, and employees--is an important part of that same mission.

The FAA mission includes the prevention of passengers or cargo shippers transporting hazardous materials or other dangerous goods in a manner that could jeopardize flight safety. The FAA also assists other agencies in the interdiction of drugs coming into the United States by air.

1996: A Year of Changes and Growth

Catastrophic events, a continual rise in the threat to domestic aviation, and major legislation drove a year of sweeping changes and growing partnerships and programs in civil aviation security.

On May 11, a hazardous materials fire in its cargo hold destroyed ValuJet Flight 592 over the Florida Everglades. None of the 110 people on board survived. Congress moved to help prevent such a disaster from occurring again. The Fiscal Year 1997 Department of Transportation Appropriations Act provided FAA with over $10 million to expand and improve the dangerous goods and air cargo security program.

The political discussion of fighting terrorism continued in 1996, culminating first in April when Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act. Section 322 of the Act, which requires foreign air carriers traveling to and from U.S. airports to have security measures identical to U.S. air carriers flying from those same airports, has great implications in international aviation security.

Raising the Domestic Aviation Security Baseline

Increased security measures have been in effect within the United States since the spring of 1995. In June 1995, contingency plans were activated in response to a specific threat by the UNABOMBER. Based on assessments from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in August 1995, the Secretary of Transportation announced a heightened state of alert for the U.S. transportation system, which included implementation of aviation security contingency plan measures. Even more stringent measures were implemented in October 1995 to remain in effect through the Atlanta Olympics in 1996, though they were adjusted several times. Contingency plans are meant to allow Government and industry to quickly respond to specific threats that would require security measures more stringent than those applied everyday.

Recent events, growth of the aviation industry, and the intelligence assessments that pointed to an increasing threat of terrorism within the United States raised concern about the standard everyday measures that formed the baseline of domestic aviation security. On the morning of July 17, 1996, the FAA s Aviation Security Advisory Committee formed a Baseline Working Group (BWG) tasked to identify options and develop recommendations for effective and sustainable system improvements. That evening TWA Flight 800 exploded after leaving John F. Kennedy International airport, killing all 230 passengers and crew. Although the cause of the explosion is still unknown, the popular speculation that a terrorist or criminal act may have caused this tragedy catapulted civil aviation security to the forefront of national attention.

President Clinton announced heightened security measures and the establishment of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (WHC) on July 25, emphasizing aviation security as a national security issue. Adding to this national focus were activities for the security of international athletes, dignitaries, and spectators traveling by air to and from the Olympic Games in Atlanta.

The BWG issued its initial report August 30. The initial WHC report followed on September 9. Representatives from the WHC worked closely with the BWG so that recommendations from the two groups were analogous. The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264), signed by the President on

October 9, mandated some of the recommendations in these reports. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 provided funding necessary to implement recommendations in the reports. During the last few months of 1996, FAA continued a whirlwind of planning and activity to set forth the recommended and mandated changes: hire and train 300 additional security personnel, purchase and deploy advanced equipment, issue new rules, and make other improvements that will begin a new era of aviation security.

SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

This section summarizes key aviation security program areas and highlights the new and expanded program activities driven by the WHC and BWG report recommendations, legislative mandates, and aviation security environment of 1996.

Partnerships

The responsibility for aviation security is a shared one. FAA assesses threats, and develops, communicates, and enforces appropriate security measures. Air carriers are responsible for applying security measures to passengers, service and flightcrew, baggage, and cargo--in short, everyone and everything that enters the aircraft. Airports are responsible for maintaining a secure ground environment and providing local law enforcement support. Other Federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Customs Service, have jurisdiction at airports and the responsibility to contribute to aviation security. The cooperation of passengers and the diligence of shippers are also needed.

Airport Consortia
…A Stronger Partnership

In its September report, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommended FAA convene parties with aviation security responsibilities to form consortia at the Nation s commercial airports. The consortia are to conduct vulnerability assessments and use the results to develop action plans to enhance security. By the close of 1996, 39 of 41 major airports that had established consortia had conducted preliminary assessments and submitted action plans to the FAA.

Aviation Security Advisory Committee

The Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) is an important partnership of FAA and representatives of other Government agencies, the aviation industry, and the flying public. The Secretary of Transportation established ASAC in 1989 in the aftermath of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 as a forum for improving civil aviation security. Plenary sessions offer the opportunity to exchange views and information. Members also sit on topical subcommittees and working groups that focus on specific security issues; the BWG was one such working group.

Air Carrier and Airport Security

Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) require the implementation of security programs by airports and air carriers. These security programs contain procedures to prevent or deter aircraft hijackings, sabotage, and other criminal

acts. The FAA and the aviation industry constantly review the procedures to ensure their effectiveness in countering threats to civil aviation.

Air Carrier Security

In 1996, 165 U.S. scheduled or charter air carriers were required to follow FAA-approved security programs. Each of these U.S. air carriers has adopted the Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP) developed by the FAA in consultation with the industry. The program requires each air carrier to implement standard security procedures. The FAA has the authority to amend the ACSSP when safety and the public interest require it, after providing air carriers a period of time to review and comment on the proposed amendment. If immediate action is required, the FAA may issue an emergency amendment to the ACSSP which is effective upon receipt. Under FAR 108.18, the FAA may also issue temporary requirements for immediate action through a security directive.

Principal Security Inspector (PSI)

PSI s are assigned to each certificated U.S. air carrier required to adopt a security program under FAR Part 108 and to each foreign air carrier subject to FAR Part 129. The PSI serves as a liaison between the FAA and the air carrier s corporate security office, representing the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and all FAA security field elements. The PSI works closely with the carrier s corporate security representatives to address areas of concern and to ensure the carrier's compliance with FAA requirements. The PSI is responsible for approving and issuing amendments to the air carrier's individual security program, as well as providing FAA policy guidance to the air carrier when regulations are developed or revised. The PSI also approves and monitors the air carrier s security training curriculum.

Joint Assessments

The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 mandated that FAA and FBI regularly conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments at high risk airports. The FBI must also designate aviation security liaisons in or near cities served by these airports. The two agencies began these efforts in 1996 by forming a joint agency working group and drafting a liaison agreement.

Airport Security

U.S. and foreign-scheduled or charter air carriers serve 459 airports within the United States which are regulated under FAR Part 107. Each airport is also required to adopt and use a security program to provide a secure operating environment for the air carriers. Of the regulated airports, 19 are designated as Category X, based on passenger traffic, complexity, and other special considerations.

Federal Security Manager (FSM)

FSM s represent the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security at the 19 Category X airports. FSM s were created by law and have been deployed by FAA since October 1, 1991. As FAA s designated security representatives, they maintain direct communication with key airport officials, airline managers, and law enforcement authorities. Their principal task is coordination and oversight of all operational security activities at their respective airports.

Compliance and Enforcement

The FAA has an ongoing and aggressive Compliance and Enforcement (C&E) program which is carried out by regional offices under national direction. The purpose of the program is to ensure that regulated parties, such as air carriers, airports, and shippers of dangerous goods, are in compliance with applicable FAR and security programs.

Assessment and Testing

While striving to achieve compliance through cooperation, the FAA must ensure air carriers, airports, and other organizations properly comply with the FAR and applicable security programs. The C&E program includes regularly scheduled comprehensive assessments. During the assessments, special agents identify security violations and weaknesses and work with industry personnel to correct deficiencies. Special agents also conduct supplemental assessments, including special emphasis assessments (SEA) that target specific areas or procedures in the aviation security system. All assessments include any one or a combination of methods: surveillance, interviews, documentation reviews, and testing.

In 1996, FAA increased the use of document review and testing methods of assessing compliance through nationally directed SEA s. For example, FAA conducted about 1,200 tests to measure air carrier compliance with increased security measures.

Aggressive Testing

The White House Commission for Aviation Safety and Security recommended a substantial increase in FAA testing. FAA is approaching testing on two fronts. First, red team testing, where an FAA special agent unknown to the aviation industry personnel at an airport takes on the role of an adversary whose intent is to breach security, will double in 1997. On the other front, aggressive testing designed to measure compliance with security regulations increased in 1996, and will continue to increase in 1997. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 enabled this increase by providing the funding to hire 300 additional FAA civil aviation security personnel to bolster the existing work force. Plans for hiring and training these special agents are complete and underway.

Enforcement

FAA strives to gain industry compliance with aviation security requirements through cooperation and communication before a violation occurs. When there are violations, enforcement of the FAR takes the form of administrative actions (warning notices or letters of correction) or civil penalties.

To achieve maximum participation and encourage complete disclosure of vulnerabilities by the regulated parties in the consortia-conducted vulnerability assessments, the FAA developed special interim enforcement action guidelines that apply to violations of FAR Parts 107 and 108. These guidelines emphasize partnerships and immediate action. The FAA does not intend ordinarily to take punitive legal enforcement action against, or issue an administrative action to, any party to a consortium for a violation disclosed during the first 60 days from the date of the first consortium meeting. The responsible party is expected to take action to correct any noncompliance. A new, permanent policy will be issued in 1997.

Violations at the Checkpoint

Individuals who attempt to bring a weapon, explosive device, or other dangerous article through a screening checkpoint are subject to enforcement actions. They may also be subject to arrest by local law enforcement. The following table summarizes the estimated number of people screened, the number of weapons detected, and the number of people arrested through passenger screening.

Civil Aviation Security Airline Passenger Screening Results
1992 - 1996

Year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Persons Screened (In Millions)	1110.8	1150.0	1261.3	1263.0	1382.1
WEAPONS DETECTED:					
Firearms	2608	2798	2994	2390	2147
Handguns	2503	2707	2860	2230	1999
Long guns	105	91	134	160	148
PERSONS ARRESTED:					
Carriage of firearms/explosives	1282	1354	1433	1194	999
Giving false information	13	31	35	68	131

Streamlining Enforcement

The Streamlined Enforcement Test and Evaluation Program (STEP), a 1-year pilot program prompted by a recommendation of the 1993 National Performance Review, concluded in 1996. The program was to test an alternative method of processing civil penalties for certain violations by individuals attempting to pass weapons through screening checkpoints. The results were so outstanding FAA has adopted the program nationwide. Under STEP, the average time to process a case decreased over 90 percent, 31 percent more people paid their sanctions, and the expected dollars that were actually paid was over 60 percent higher.

Efforts to improve the enforcement process for aviation security and other regulatory areas will continue in 1997. Many of the principles of STEP will be applied to more types of aviation security violations and other regulatory violations as FAA conducts a series of workshops to review the enforcement process and establish streamlining programs.

Aviation Security: People

The effectiveness of the aviation security system depends on the capabilities and integrity of the people who screen passengers and their possessions. In 1987, the FAA amended the ACSSP to require carriers to detect FAA weapons and simulated explosive devices. The agency began taking enforcement action for each carrier's failure to detect an FAA test object. The following chart displays the rates at which screeners detected the test objects during FAA tests for the past 5 years.

Test Object Detection Rate (Percent)



Screeners should not be trained merely to detect FAA test objects; the FAA requires that they be trained to detect actual weapons, firearms, and explosive devices. But because they are tested with a small number of approved test objects, an unintended consequence is that screeners specifically look for those test objects. New and more challenging test objects were necessary to portray more realistically the explosives and techniques used by terrorist groups.

In 1994, the FAA started evaluations at U.S. airports to determine the effectiveness of the modular bomb set (MBS) as a training tool and to expose screeners to more sophisticated simulated improvised explosive devices (IED). The components of the MBS can be arranged into 48 different configurations. The FAA continued these evaluations into 1995 assessing the effectiveness of screeners in detecting a variety of MBS configurations in carry-on and checked baggage. The primary goals during the latter part of 1995 and 1996 have been to validate the usefulness of MBS and to increase screeners detection of IED s. Results indicate a continued need for improvement in this area.

Screener of the Year

On July 16, FAA Administrator David Hinson presented the Second Annual Screener of the Year Award to Ms. Dianne Robinson, a checkpoint security supervisor at Honolulu International Airport. The FAA, the Air Transport Association, Regional Airline Association, National Air Carrier Association, and Airline Pilots Association sponsor this award in recognition of outstanding contributions to civil aviation security by aviation security professionals. Ms. Robinson has been the supervisor at Honolulu s busiest checkpoint for 3 years and has been recognized by air carriers on numerous occasions for exceptional performance. She received a plaque from the sponsors and a check for $1,000.

Human Factors

The widespread use of the MBS as a test object may be replaced due to the FAA s pursuit of technology to enhance human performance in screening. The screener proficiency evaluation and reporting system (SPEARS) uses computer-based training (CBT) and threat image projection (TIP) components to improve screening through improvements in the selection, training, certification, and operational performance assessment of a screener. The WHC and BWG recommended FAA proceed with the testing, purchase, and deployment of SPEARS. In 1997, both the CBT and TIP components of SPEARS will be installed at all Category X airports, and installation of CBT components at Category I airports will begin. Human factors research will also be applied to

other security programs throughout the system, such as the explosives detection systems program and passenger profiling.

Information and Access Control

Aviation security is as much dependent on the integrity of people who have access to secure areas and information as their screening capabilities. Rulemaking activity in 1996 featured efforts to protect the aviation system from people with dishonest or malicious intent to compromise security or people who could be duped by those individuals. The Unescorted Access Privilege rule, FAR Section 107.31, which requires people seeking unescorted access to restricted areas of the airport to have employment history checks, became effective on January 31, 1996. This rule implements the employment investigation provisions of Section 105 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990.

Rulemaking activity continued on the Sensitive Security Information rule which will allow FAA to hold individuals accountable for releasing sensitive national security information to persons other than those with a bona fide need to know. FAA also began rulemaking activity for two rules to implement provisions of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996. One will require employment history checks, to include criminal history records checks when necessary, on screeners, their supervisors, and individuals who exercise security functions associated with baggage or cargo. The second will require the certification of screening companies, holding the companies and their employees to certain performance standards and promoting professionalism. The FAA expects to publish final rules in 1998.

A Quick Response

In November 1996, a national television network broadcast a story by an investigative reporter who was hired by an aviation services company that did not verify his employment history. The reporter had used falsified documents to obtain the position which allowed unescorted access to secure airport areas. The FAA quickly launched a national special emphasis assessment to determine the extent the problem may exist throughout the aviation system. While the results did not indicate a widespread problem, the FAA took immediate action toward preventing the further use of falsified records. Invoking procedures for emergency rulemaking, the FAA published the Falsification of Security Records rule on November 27.

The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 mandates periodic audits of the effectiveness of the criminal history records checks. FAA aviation security special agents will conduct these audits in the course of assessments.

Universal Access System (UAS)

Each airport issues appropriate airport and air carrier personnel identification to allow unescorted access to restricted areas of the airport. A UAS would permit

flightcrews and other transient airline employees to carry a single computerized ID/access media for use at any participating airport. Congress authorized (P.L. 103-305) $2 million to fund the development and initial implementation of UAS for transient flightcrews. The UAS standards and test program were developed jointly with the ASAC. Access portals have been installed at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport and Miami International Airport for use by participating crews of Northwest Airlines and Delta Air Lines. Delta Air Lines is also operating a centralized data base in Atlanta to serve as a single repository of the identification records of participating air carrier transient employees. Although not part of the test program, USAir is also participating in UAS and has initiated its own UAS system at the Charlotte International Airport.

FAA is using the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to manage the project with Mei Technologies as the contractor. The test program was completed in December 1996, and in 1997 an ASAC task force will review the Volpe report of the installation and operational results, modify the standards as necessary, and develop a plan for voluntary implementation of UAS at participating airports. Additionally, the access control standards will include language adopted by RTCA, an international standards body, that will ensure compatibility with UAS standards.

Domestic Aviation Security Training

The FAA develops and manages an extensive training program for FAA personnel and others with responsibilities for civil aviation security. Aviation security training for FAA special agents is generally conducted as resident training at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City. Specialized training in communications security, criminal investigations, and other topics is provided out-of-agency at various locations throughout the country by the Department of Defense, General Services Administration, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and other vendors. The FAA trained 286 FAA students in basic and advanced aviation security and internal security programs in 1996.

The FAA also conducts seminars and training for state and local law enforcement officers and for airport and air carrier managers and security personnel to encourage successful implementation of policy and regulations and to counter the terrorist threat to air transportation. In 1996, the FAA trained 447 non-FAA students in eight locations in the continental United States and Puerto Rico. Appendix I lists FAA training courses and student distribution.

Aviation Security: Technology

The skills and integrity of the people involved with aviation security are only part of what makes the aviation system secure. The people must have effective equipment to do their job. The FAA and its partners in aviation and other industries work together to pursue advancements in technology and integrate them into the civil aviation security system.

Explosives Trace Detection

Explosives trace detectors are noninvasive detectors suited for screening baggage, electronic items, and even people for traces of explosives. Using various technologies, explosives trace detectors can detect explosive vapors or explosive particles or both explosives vapors and particles. FAA used four models of trace detectors to support security for the Olympics at three airports from January through September 1996. Contracts to purchase up to 489 trace explosives detection devices with funds from the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 are in process. By November 1996, the FAA awarded contracts to purchase 30 devices and began deployment.

Partners in Equipment Deployment

In October 1996, a security equipment integrated product team of acquisition and security experts was formed within the FAA to plan, purchase, and install explosives detection devices and other advanced security equipment at many of the busiest U.S. airports. FAA personnel are joined by representatives of airport authorities and air carriers as members of the team. Its objective is to implement White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommendations and provisions of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, using $144 million for the purchase of equipment provided by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997.

Bulk Explosives Detection

Technology today offers several kinds of equipment designed to detect bulk explosives such as may be concealed in checked or large carry-on baggage. The equipment varies in the types and amounts of explosives it may detect. FAR Section 108.20 requires air carriers to use an explosives detection system (EDS) approved by the FAA to screen checked baggage on international flights when the Administrator so requires. Title 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44913 mandates that prior to requiring widespread deployment the FAA must certify, based on tests using test protocols developed in consultation with expert scientists, that EDS performance meets stringent performance criteria.

In 1994, the FAA approved the InVision CTX 5000, which uses computed tomography, as the first certified EDS. To help bring it about, FAA awarded

grants to three air carriers to demonstrate, starting in the fall of 1995, EDS in integrated operation to develop practical guidance for industry. The FAA is using data generated from ongoing demonstrations in Atlanta, San Francisco, and Manila to assist in deployment decisions. Following recommendations from the WHC and BWG, the FAA is purchasing and deploying additional FAA certified explosives detection systems with funding from the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997. A contract was awarded to InVision Technologies in December 1996 for an initial delivery of 54 units. The FAA also awarded two grants in pursuit of a faster, less expensive second-generation computed tomography device.

Another Method of Detection

In August 1996, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking that expands the possibility for more certified explosives detection systems. The rule issues standards for FAA certification of explosives detection systems that will detect detonators. FAA expects to publish the final Detonator Detection Standards Rule in 1997.

The WHC and BWG also recommended the immediate deployment of advanced technology equipment not certified by FAA in the interim until mandatory EDS deployment. These include enhanced x-rays and other commercially available devices that will be purchased with funding from the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997.

Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS)

The large number of passengers and bags moving through the aviation system make it necessary to focus the application of some time-consuming security measures using existing technology. Profiling makes the most of limited security resources to keep the aviation system functioning close to current capacity. Development of the automated profiling system known as Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening or CAPS, a joint project of Northwest Airlines and the FAA, continued in 1996. CAPS utilizes computer evaluation of information contained in a passenger s reservation to determine whether the passenger should undergo additional security measures beyond those required for all passengers. The WHC considered CAPS and endorsed the continued development and implementation of such a system. The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 also supported continued FAA assistance to air carriers in developing computer-assisted passenger profiling programs . . . which should be used in conjunction with other security measures and technologies. By the end of 1996, development of CAPS had proceeded to the point that full operational capability for Northwest Airlines is anticipated for 1997. Technical discussions

on the adaptation and export of CAPS to other airlines reservation systems began in 1996; the FAA is assisting in this process through a series of contracts.

Aircraft and Container Hardening

To complement efforts in explosives detection, FAA is conducting an aircraft hardening program. The specific goal of the program is to reduce the vulnerability of commercial aircraft to terrorist threats by: (1) determining the minimum size of explosive that must be detected; (2) identifying what can be done to the current and future fleet of commercial airliners to make them more resistant to explosive sabotage; (3) hardening aircraft cargo and baggage containers to increase the survivability of aircraft to explosive attacks; and (4) determining the threat to aircraft from other advanced technical means.

The FAA is performing a congressionally mandated study on the costs and potential benefits between varying explosives detection levels, blast management, blast containment, and structural enhancements. An operational demonstration of prototype containers will be completed in 1997.

Other Safeguards

Programs or measures other than screening also offer safeguards to protect the flying public and the personnel and facilities that keep the aviation system running smoothly.

Positive Passenger Baggage Match

The WHC recommended implementation of a full passenger-baggage match, initially based upon profiling, by December 31, 1997. A full passenger-baggage match ensures no unaccompanied bag enters the system and that a bag is removed if the passenger does not board. The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 requires FAA to report on the safety, operational effectiveness, and value of full implementation of passenger-baggage match. The FAA, Air Transport Association, and WHC staff worked together to develop a pilot program that is unbiased and an accurate predictor of the effects of systemwide implementation.

The first phase of the pilot program was completed in 1996. An independent third party, the Center for Excellence in Aviation Research, refined and verified existing operational models. The air carriers collected data for analysis and computer modeling while being monitored by an FAA observation team. Phase II will be completed in 1997 and will include data analysis and live testing observed by a joint team of FAA and third party consultants. The results of the

analysis of operational and cost impacts of passenger-baggage match will be reported to Congress in 1997.

K-9 Explosives Detection

Since 1972, the FAA has worked with airport authorities and local law enforcement entities in a cooperative effort to use canine teams to prevent the introduction of improvised explosives devices and other explosive materials into the civil aviation transportation system. A K-9 team consists of a specially trained dog and handler. During the first part of 1996, there were 29 airport participants with more than 90 teams in the FAA K-9 Explosives Detection Team Program. In September, the FAA welcomed a new participant to its K-9 program--The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Each team receives special training in searching aircraft properly (widebody and narrowbody), vehicles, terminal areas, freight facilities (cargo), and passenger luggage. All teams must pass a comprehensive proficiency evaluation annually in order to remain FAA-certified in explosives detection.

Partners With Paws

The recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, and the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, fundamentally changed the FAA K-9 program. From September through December 1996, the FAA worked to develop a deployment strategy for the significant expansion of the use of bomb-sniffing dogs. In early December, the FAA and industry met to discuss the new requirements of the program, as well as Federal reimbursement support to airports and law enforcement entities that elected to participate.

Although participation in the FAA K-9 Explosives Detection Team Program is still voluntary, FAA anticipates the deployment strategy will eventually encompass about 240 teams nationally.

Federal Air Marshal (FAM)

The FAM program provides an armed security force whose mission is to protect the traveling public and flightcrews on U.S. air carriers by deterring criminal and terrorist acts which target aircraft in flight. FAM s undergo specialized law enforcement training and maintain very stringent physical fitness and firearms proficiency standards. The FAM operational training facility is located at the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

The FAM force is capable of rapid deployment worldwide. During 1996, FAM s provided in-flight security on flights of all major U.S. air carriers to and from 74 cities in 43 countries. Just knowing that FAM s could be on board may deter someone who is planning to interfere with a flight. To make the most of this deterrence value, FAA took opportunities in 1996 to publicize certain

carefully considered features of the FAM program. For example, in February CNN Worldwide News and CNN Headline News broadcast all over the world a story about the FAM program, and in June, NBC Nightly News carried a story on the FAM s as part of their coverage of security efforts pertaining to the Olympics.

Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security Program

The new Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security Program is the result of a thorough FAA task force review of its hazardous materials and cargo security enforcement program. This review was prompted by a growing number of hazardous materials incidents involving air transportation, including the loss of ValuJet Flight 592 on May 11, 1996. Also in response to the ValuJet tragedy, the FAA conducted over 300 inspections of air carriers to determine if they had policies and procedures to assist their personnel in identifying possible undeclared hazardous materials.

In September 1996, Congress authorized the FAA to hire an additional 118 inspectors and 12 attorneys to increase dangerous goods compliance and enforcement efforts. These specialized inspectors have exclusive responsibility for the enforcement of hazardous materials and cargo security regulations. For the first time, the FAA will conduct hazardous materials inspections at aircraft repair stations, air freight forwarder facilities, and air shippers of dangerous goods. Inspectors will be dual trained in cargo security procedures to ensure that air cargo facilities are also applying proper security measures to prevent terrorism. Pairing up hazardous materials and cargo security enforcement responsibilities will optimize the inspectors time at air carrier cargo facilities and air freight forwarder facilities. Inspections and other program activities also will increase at foreign locations for air carriers and others involved in the air transportation of hazardous materials and cargo to the United States.

Expanded Outreach

The FAA believes that undeclared or hidden shipments of hazardous materials pose the greatest danger in hazardous materials transport. Most of these undeclared shipments are due to a lack of awareness concerning the hazardous materials regulations on the part of shippers. To combat this, the FAA plans an expanded public outreach effort targeting particular industries, trade associations, air freight forwarders, air carriers, and air passengers to explain the dangers and possible penalties for failing to comply with the hazardous materials regulations. In 1996, FAA began cooperative projects with DOT Research and Special Programs Administration to produce videotapes, information brochures, and computer training modules. One such project was the printing and distribution of 10 million airline passenger information brochures advising on hazardous materials restrictions.

Drug Interdiction

Investigations conducted by special agents in the Drug Investigations Support Program (DISP) resulted in a 74 percent increase in airmen certificate revocations in 1996. The 276 revocations are due to the success of the FAA/Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Federal Probation and Parole match programs in which inmate, probation, and parole records are matched against the Airmen Registry. Airmen found convicted for drug smuggling are subject to certificate action. There were also 57 airmen certificate suspensions and 2 aircraft registration certificates revoked in 1996.

Interference with Flightcrews Pilot Project

In October 1996, FAA initiated a pilot project in Los Angeles and Honolulu in response to an apparent increase in the number of incidents of assault on flightcrews. Civil aviation security personnel will respond to incidents and work with local law enforcement, FBI, and U.S. Attorneys to ensure prosecution of passengers who assault or threaten to assault flightcrews.

Protecting the Infrastructure

The FAA s infrastructure, including personnel, facilities, and systems is critical to the safe and efficient management of the National Airspace System (NAS). Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 emphasizes the urgency of safeguarding the Nation s critical infrastructure assets. During 1996, in response to PDD 39, the FAA increased efforts to identify its critical assets and quantify the risks associated with them. To accomplish this objective and to plan and implement the necessary risk reduction measures, the agency has developed a security risk management program. A capability for assessment of risk agencywide and a mission need statement to provide resources needed to identify and manage the implementation of required risk reduction countermeasures have evolved from this program. The security risk management program will address the risk management needs of FAA s more than 48,000 employees, as well as the countermeasures applicable to the infrastructure facility inventory of more than 1,000 staffed facilities, and 8,200 nonstaffed facilities and associated assets.

Security Risk Management Assessments

An important part of the FAA program for identifying and managing security risk is conducting security risk management assessments at the most critical FAA air traffic control and NAS support facilities. This program began in 1996 with FAA special agents completing five assessments of different types of facilities, and plans are in place to expand to cover an increased number of critical facilities.

International Aviation Security

Aviation security is a worldwide concern. The FAA's major efforts are concentrated on U.S. airports, U.S. air carriers wherever they fly, and foreign air carriers serving the United States. However, the FAA works closely with other governments in raising the level of security provided by all air carriers and airports, regardless of nationality. As carriers share or interchange equipment, personnel, management, and investment, global aviation increasingly requires global cooperation in security.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that was established by the Chicago Convention in December 1944. ICAO establishes international aviation security Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP) for its 183 Member States. The Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security works closely with ICAO to strengthen these standards and to ensure compliance with them throughout the international aviation system. Three pertinent conventions provide the foundation for these SARP s. Amendment 9 to Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention, which elevates cargo security, was approved by the ICAO council to become effective April 1, 1997, with an implementation date of August 1, 1997. The Aviation Security Panel, composed of representatives from 15 States and a number of industry observers, is scheduled to meet in September 1997.

Recognizing the importance of aviation security in ICAO and the needs of its expanded aviation security office, the United States continues to provide two FAA security specialists for ICAO at no expense to the organization. ICAO uses these specialists to conduct security surveys and training for countries in need throughout the world.

European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)

The ECAC is an intergovernmental consultative organization that was established in 1955 by the Council of Europe with the active support of ICAO. ECAC's objectives are to encourage the safe and orderly development of civil aviation to, from, and within Europe. The Conference in 1996 expanded to 35 Member States.

In the field of security, ECAC's objective is to ensure the maximum level of security possible within ECAC and with its partners serving its airports. ECAC Member States apply ICAO Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices. In addition, supplementary measures appropriate to the conditions pertaining to Europe are promulgated by ECAC through its frequently revised security

manual. While the aviation security measures contained in the manual are not mandatory, the expectation within ECAC is that all Member States will comply. The United States (FAA), Canada, and Israel have been granted permanent observer status on the ECAC Security Committee.

Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officers (CASLO)

In areas outside of the United States, CASLO s are the primary FAA contact with U.S. embassies and host governments on civil aviation security matters. Their responsibilities include assisting U.S. and foreign air carriers implementing FAA security requirements, the exchange of threat information, and onsite FAA coordination during aviation security incidents. In 1996, a CASLO office was opened in Manila, increasing the number of CASLO s to 19. Appendix II lists CASLO locations and the geographic areas covered.

Foreign Air Carrier (FAC) Security

FAR Part 129 requires FAC's operating to the United States to submit security programs to the FAA for acceptance for their operations to, from, and within the United States. FAC's may adopt the model security program (MSP) prepared by the FAA, submit their own security programs for review, or refer the FAA to a foreign government that performs security procedures at a last point of departure to the United States.

At the end of 1996, there were 164 FAC's operating to and from the United States that were required to have security programs acceptable to the Administrator. All FAC's have been required since September 1992 to adopt the FAA's MSP when operating from the United States. The FAC's have adopted either the FAA's MSP, both for flights from and to the United States, or have submitted an acceptable program that meets the performance standards contained in the MSP.

Sixteen of the 17 foreign carriers for which FAA s analysis shows a need for additional security measures have had their security

Identical Measures

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, passed by Congress in April 1996, changed Title 49, U.S.C. Section 44906. Formerly, the FAA was required to ensure that passengers were provided a level of protection when flying to or from the United States on foreign air carriers similar to that provided when flying on U.S. air carriers from those same airports. The Act changed Section 44906 to require foreign air carriers traveling to and from U.S. airports to have security measures identical to U.S. air carriers flying from those same airports. Rulemaking activities to implement the Act began in 1996. The potential for increased costs to foreign carriers and issues of national sovereignty may cause controversy during the rulemaking process.

programs amended. These strengthened security measures have been a result of negotiations with the host government s civil aviation authority, the air carrier s corporate offices, and, where necessary, the civil aviation authority of the country which is the last point of departure to the United States. The FAA continuously assesses threats against all foreign air carriers and will not hesitate to discuss and, if necessary, impose additional security measures to meet any threat.

Foreign Airport Assessments

As mandated by Title 49, U.S.C. 44907, the FAA performs scheduled, onsite formal evaluations of foreign airports served by U.S. air carriers, or from which foreign air carriers serve the United States, which pose a high risk of introducing danger to international travel, and such other airports as the Secretary of Transportation may deem appropriate. The purpose of the assessments is to determine the extent to which foreign aeronautical authorities effectively maintain and carry out security measures. For those airports that are assessed as not having effective security measures, the Secretary of Transportation may issue an action such as public notification. In 1996, approximately 240 foreign airports qualified for assessment under the law.

This number fluctuates as changes in air carrier service occur. In recent years, the total has slowly risen as more airports seek to meet international travel demands, and as more air carriers, both foreign and U.S., expand their international routes. The number of FAA assessments at each foreign airport is based on reviews and analyses of current resources and threat conditions. The FAA has revised the foreign assessment program to focus resources on those airports that may have difficulty sustaining effective security measures. These focused efforts will include interagency actions to alert aviation officials to potential vulnerabilities. This enables the respective host governments to take steps to resolve the issues before serious deficiencies develop.

The FAA conducted 88 foreign airport assessments in 1996. As a result of these assessments, the FAA made 353 security recommendations to foreign governments. Recommendations were in the areas of access control, airport administration, screening, airport emergency planning, national administration, baggage and cargo security controls, and law enforcement support. In 1996, the following secretarial actions were in effect.

- On October 8, 1992, an assessment of the airport in Lagos, Nigeria, resulted in an immediate public notification without the usual 90-day notice. As a result of the public notice, FAA provided technical assistance and security

training for 9 months to the Nigerian Government. In July 1993, a second assessment was conducted in Lagos. On August 11, 1993, the Secretary suspended air service between the United States and Lagos citing the failure of cognizant authorities to correct deficiencies satisfactorily. Another assessment was conducted in April 1994 and the Secretary determined that the suspension should remain in effect. An interagency team returned to Lagos in November 1995 to determine if satisfactory progress had been achieved regarding eliminating the adverse impact of corruption on aviation security. As of the end of 1996, the Secretary s suspension order remained in place.

- On July 28, 1995, an assessment of the airport in Manila, Philippines, resulted in a public notification that the government of the Philippines was unable to maintain and carry out effective security measures there. As a result of the public notice, the FAA provided technical assistance and security training for 6 months with the Philippine Government. Steady progress in correcting the airport s deficiencies was reported and resulted in the removal of the public notice on March 1, 1996.

- On August 28, 1995, an assessment of the airport in Bogota, Colombia, resulted in a public notification that the government of Colombia was unable to maintain and carry out effective security measures there. As a result of the public notice, the FAA helped the government of Colombia accomplish the corrective actions. This technical assistance and security training for the government of Colombia resulted in improvements in the security posture at Eldorado International Airport. The Secretary determined that the airport met international security standards and the public notice was removed on December 23, 1996.

- On March 21, 1996, an assessment of the airport in Athens, Greece, resulted in a public notification that the government was unable to maintain and carry out effective security measures there. The FAA assisted the government of Greece to accomplish corrective actions, including the services of an FAA aviation security expert and specialized training. This technical assistance and security training resulted in the removal of the public notice on May 15, 1996.

International Aviation Security Training

The FAA provides aviation security training to international airport managers from developing countries. In 1996, 215 students from 17 countries attended

training at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City and in Haiti and Turkey. Courses and student distribution are listed in Appendix I.

The FAA also participates in the Department of State (DOS) Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATAP). This program provides technical assistance to foreign countries by conducting training needs surveys of foreign airports. The results may lead to ATAP providing either the aviation security training or technical support, or both, necessary to bring the airport into compliance with ICAO standards. Senior foreign government officials responsible for aviation security participate in intensive training programs that enhance their abilities to administer comprehensive programs designed to prevent or deter violent criminal acts against aviation. This cooperative effort with DOS ensures that the security concepts and techniques are integrated and applied worldwide to enhance aviation safety and security.

In 1996, ATAP provided a training needs assessment in Greece and airport security management seminars in Greece and Mexico. ATAP also provided training for students from Peru and Romania in the Airport Security Management Course at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City.

Conclusion: Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation

Growing partnerships, legislation, and funding marked a renewed commitment to aviation security in 1996 and a broader recognition that aviation security is a national security issue. Due to these efforts, terrorists will confront a less vulnerable (and therefore a less attractive target) commercial air transportation system in the United States in the years ahead. The combination of intelligence, law enforcement, and the diligent application of security measures are the keys to maintaining deterrence and an effective civil aviation security system. Increased Federal, local, and aviation industry resources applied in these areas should help ensure that the infrequency of criminal acts against U.S. civil aviation in the recent past is a pattern that extends into the future.

The cause of the midair explosion of TWA Flight 800 in July 1996 has not been conclusively established. The theory favored by investigators is that the destruction was a result of catastrophic mechanical failure. If so, then 1996 would be the second consecutive year and fourth year of the past five, with no known instances of explosive devices detonating on board aircraft.

Assuming the crash of TWA Flight 800 was not the result of a bombing, there have been no such attacks against U.S. civil aviation since Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. More recent events, however, have shown that the threat has not disappeared. In January 1995, Philippine police uncovered a plot to blow up as many as 12 U.S. airliners operating from the Pacific region. Even though this plot, like the Pan Am Flight 103 attack, involved the placement of bombs on U.S. aircraft operating from overseas locations, the chances that a similar attack might be attempted in the United States have probably increased. The mastermind of that plot, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, was convicted in a U.S. court for his role in the conspiracy. Mr. Yousef has also been indicted for his role in the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. That bombing, and the subsequent plot to bomb a number of targets in New York City, proved that foreign terrorists are active within the United States.

There were no hijackings recorded either in the United States or aboard U.S.-registered aircraft in 1996. The most recent hijacking in the United States was in 1991. This was also the last hijacking incident involving a U.S.-registered aircraft. Only one hijacking attempt has been made on a U.S.-bound foreign-registered aircraft in the past 5 years: an Air China flight from Beijing to New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport in December 1993.

During the past 5 years, 89 hijackings have been recorded worldwide. The majority of these incidents took place on domestic (internal) routes; only 24 aircraft were on international routes. Fourteen hijackings were recorded worldwide in 1996, including eight on domestic flights.

The overall number of incidents can serve as a rough index of the level of criminal activity involving commercial aircraft. Because of differences in situations specific to individual countries and varying motivation among perpetrators, any generalizations must be very carefully drawn.

APPENDIX I

FAA Training Distribution

Course Title	FAA	Non-FAA	INT'L
Instructor Development Workshop (70000)	35		
International Airport Assessments and Inspections - Recurrent (70002)	29		
CAS Investigations (70020)	17		
Facilities Security Inspection Course (70023)	16		
CAS Special Agent CORE Training (70028)	34		
Security Countermeasures Technology Seminar (70029)	29		
CAS Compliance and Enforcement (70034)	48		
ACS Crisis Management Response Training (70040)	10		
Crisis Management for Special Agents (75000)	13		
Air Transportation of Hazardous Materials Recurrent-IVT (75200)	55		
Civil Aviation Security Training (70012)[1]		148	
CAS Special Interest Seminar (70022)[2]		299	
Civil Aviation Security - International (70013)[3]			22
CAS Technical Assistance (70025)[4]			23
Airport Security Management Seminar - Turkey (70062)			170
DOS ATAP Airport Security Management Course - Oklahoma City (70060)[5]			47
DOS ATAP Airport Security Management Seminar - Mexico and Greece (70061/70062)			362

1 Five classes were conducted at the following locations: Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Windsor Locks, Connecticut; San Jose, California.

2 Four classes were conducted in the following locations: Two in Denver, Colorado; one each in Orlando, Florida, and Phoenix, Arizona.

3 One class was conducted for participants from the following countries: Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, and Vietnam.

4 Conducted in Haiti.

5 Trained 23 participants from Peru and 24 participants from Romania.

TOTAL STUDENTS	286	447	624

APPENDIX II

Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officers
Location and Area Covered

Location	Area Covered
Paris	France, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia
Vienna	Austria, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia/Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovak Republic
Rome	Italy, Greece, Israel, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon
Copenhagen	Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
Frankfurt	Germany
London	United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland
Madrid	Spain, Portugal, Cape Verde
Brussels	Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Netherlands, Czech Republic
Brussels	Russia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Poland
Dakar	All nations in Africa except for those specifically stated and covered by CASLO s in Paris, Madrid, and Manama
Manama	Bahrain, Afghanistan, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Sydney	Australia, New Zealand, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Micronesia, New Caledonia, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu, Western Samoa
Bangkok	Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Macau
Singapore	Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea
Tokyo	Japan, China, South Korea
Buenos Aires	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay
Manila	Philippines
Miami (2)	Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, Caribbean Nations, Suriname

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACSSP	Air Carrier Standard Security Program
ASAC	Aviation Security Advisory Committee
ATAP	Department of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
BWG	Baseline Working Group of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
CAPS	Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening
CAS	Civil Aviation Security
CASLO	Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officer
CBT	Computer Based Training
DISP	Drug Investigation Support Program
DOS	Department of State
ECAC	European Civil Aviation Conference
EDS	Explosives Detection System
FAC	Foreign Air Carrier
FAM	Federal Air Marshal
FAR	Federal Aviation Regulations
FSM	Federal Security Manager
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
MBS	Modular Bomb Set
MSP	Model Security Program
NAS	National Airspace System
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PSI	Principal Security Inspector
RTCA	Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
SARP	ICAO Standard and Recommended Practice
SEA	Special Emphasis Assessment
SEIPT	Security Equipment Integrated Product Team
SPEARS	Screener Efficiency and Evaluation Reporting System
STEP	Streamlined Enforcement Test and Evaluation Program
TIP	Threat Image Projection
UAS	Universal Access System
WHC	White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security